The general stable roommates problem with n agents has time and space complexity O(n 2 ). Random instances can be solved faster and with less memory, however. We introduce an algorithm that has average time and space complexity O(n 3 2 ) for random instances. We use this algorithm to simulate large instances of the stable roommates problem and to measure the probabilty pn that a random instance of size n admits a stable matching. Our data supports the conjecture that pn = Θ(n −1/4 ).
INTRODUCTION
Matching under preferences is a topic of great practical importance, deep mathematical structure, and elegant algorithmics [Manlove 2013; Gusfield and Irving 1989] . The most famous example is the stable marriage problem, where n men and n women compete with each other in the "marriage market." Each man ranks all the women according to his individual preferences, and each woman does the same with all men. Everybody wants to get married to someone at the top of his or her list, but mutual attraction is not symmetric and frustration and compromises are unavoidable. A minimum requirement is a matching of men and women such that no man and woman would agree to leave their assigned partners in order to marry each other. Such a matching is called stable since no individual has an icentive to break it. The problem then is to find such a stable matching.
The stable marriage problem was introduced David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962 [Gale and Shapley 1962] . In their seminal paper they proved that each instance of the marriage problem has at least one stable solution, and they presented an efficient algorithm to find it. Since then, the Gale-Shapley algorithm has been applied to many real-world problems, not by dating agencies but by central bodies that organize twosided markets like the assignment of students to colleges or residents to hospitals [Roth and Sotomayor 1990] .
The salient feature of the stable marriage problem is its bipartite structure: the agents form two groups (men and women), and matchings are only allowed between these groups but not within a group. This is adequate for two-sided markets. But what about one-sided markets, like the formation of cockpit crews from a pool of pilots or the A:2 assignment of students to the double bedrooms in a dormitory? The latter is is known as the stable roommates problem. It is the paradigmatic example for matchings in one-sided markets.
The stable roommates problem was also introduced by Gale and Shapley [Gale and Shapley 1962] . They noted an intriguing difference between the marriage and the roommates problem: Whereas the former always has a solution, the latter may have none.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm for bipartite matching does not work for non-bipartite problems like the stable roommates problem. In fact some people believed that the roommates problem was NP-complete [Moore and Mertens 2011] , but more than 20 years after the Gale-Shapley paper, Robert Irving presented a polynomial time algorithm for the stable roommates problem [Irving 1985 ]. Irving's algorithm either yields a stable solution or "No" if none exists.
An instance of the stable roommates problem consists of an even number n of persons (students, pilots), each of whom ranks all of the others in strict order of preference. Since each person has to keep a list of preferences for all n − 1 other persons, an instance of the stable roommates problem has size Θ(n 2 ). Irving's algorithm has time complexity O(n 2 ). This is optimal if we assume that one has to look at the complete instance (or at least a finite fraction of it) in order to solve the problem.
In this paper we show that in random instances, Irving's algorithm only looks at O( √ n) entries in each preference list, and we provide a modification of the algorithm that has average time and space complexity O(n 3 2 ). We use this algorithm to compute the probability p n that a random instance of size n has a solution for n ≤ 57344.
The paper is organized as follows. We start with a review of Irving's algorithm. In Section 3 we discuss the complexity of Irving's algorithm for random instances and our modification that reduces the average time and space complexity from O(n 2 ) to O(n 3 2 ). Section 4 comprises the results of the simulations on p n , obtained with the modified algorithm.
THE ALGORITHM
Irving's algorithm can be expressed as a sequence of "proposals" from one person to another. Initially, all persons are free. If person x makes a proposal to person y (to share a room, to form a cockpit crew etc.), y can accept or reject this proposal. If y accepts the proposal, x ceases to be free and becomes semiengaged to y. If y later receives another proposal from someone he prefers to x, he will accept the new proposal and cancel the semiengagement from x, who will in turn change its state again to free.
As the name suggests, semiengagement is not symmetric: if x is semiengaged to y, y can still be free or semiengaged to z = x. If all semiengagements are symmetric, they represent a matching.
Irving's algorithm proceeds in two phases. Phase I sets up semiengagements for everybody. In phase II, these semiengagements are modified by cyclically swapping partners until all semiengagements are symmetric, i.e., until they represent a matching. The corresponding sequence of proposals (and breakups) is organized such that the resulting matching is stable. If the instance admits no stable matching, this is recognized either in phase I or phase II by running out of partners to propose to.
For the time being, we assume that the preferences of all participants are stored in a two 2-dimensional arrays: The two arrays are not independent, of course, but the redundancy allows us to look up persons and ranks in time O(1).
For random instances we initialize the preference list of person x a by random permutation of all other persons (including x) and then move x to the very end of its own preference list. This means that we allow x being matched with himself as the worst choice. If this really happens, this means that x has no proper partner, i.e. that no stable matching exists for that instance.
In our implementation of the algorithm we will access the preference lists only through the function function GETDATA(x,i)
return (y,r) end function which returns the pair (y, r) where y is the person with rank i in x's prefence list and r is the rank of person x in y's preference list.
We will describe both phases of Irving's algorithm without proving their correctness. For the proofs we refer the reader to Irving's original paper [Irving 1985 ].
Phase I
Phase I of the algorithm tries to establish semiengagements for every person. The general idea is that the first proposal of x goes to the first person on his preference list, and only if this proposal is rejected (immediately or subsequently), x proposes to the second person on his preference list and so on. On the receiving side, y accepts a proposal only if the proposing person ranks higher on his preference list than the person whose proposal he has currently accepted.
Imagine the list of preferences written horizontally left (most desired partner) to right (least desired partner). Then the proposals made move from left to right, while the proposals accepted move from right to left. In a matching, both types of proposals meet at the same position. This motivates the names for the following lists that hold the current set of proposals: Again these lists are not independent, but the redundancy allows a faster lookup especially in phase II. Figure 1 shows the pseudocode for phase I of Irving's algorithm. It stops, when every person holds a proposal, which implies that every person has also made a proposal that has been accepted, i.e. that every person is semiengaged. It returns false if someone has run out of partners (and is therefore engaged to himself), which means that there is no stable matching for this instance. If it returns true, we can still hope to find a stable matching in phase II of the algorithm.
Phase II
Phase I usually ends with everybody semiengaged to someone, but with asymmetric engagements leftrank[x] < rightrank[x] for most persons x. Such persons have to give up their current proposal to leftperson [x] and find somebody down the list that would (temporarily) accept a proposal from x. We keep track of these second choices in the following lists If x withdraws his proposal and proposes to y = secondperson [x] , who temporarily accepts the proposal, the previous partners of x and y both loose their semiengagements and have to look themselves for their second best partners and so on. This avalanche of break-ups and new propsals is called a rotation. It reduces the difference rightrank[x]-leftrank[x] for several persons x and is a step towards a matching.
The key idea of phase II is to organize this rearrangement of semiengagements in a so called all-or-nothing cycle. This is a sequence a 1 . . . , a r of persons such that a i 's current second choice is a i+1 's current first choice for i = 1 . . . , r − 1, and a r 's current second choice is a 1 's current first choice. In terms of our lists, an all-or-nothing cycle is given by
In phase II of Irving's algorithm, an all-or-nothing cycle is identified and the correspodning rotation is executed. This process is iterated until there are no more all-ornothing cycles (in which case we've found a stable matching) or until someone runs out of partners after a rotation (in which case this instance has no stable matching). end if 27: end procedure Fig. 2 . Finding an all-or-nothing cycle for phase II of the stable roommates algorithm Figure 2 shows the pseudocode for a function that finds and returns an all-ornothing cycle or an empty cycle. To compute a cycle we need to identify the person whose current first choice is y = secondperson [x] . But this person is simply given by rightperson[y], i.e., it can be found in time O(1) (see line 20 of Figure 2) . Figure 3 shows pseudocode for phase II which finds an all-or-nothing cycle, executes the corresponding rotation and iterates this until there are no more all-or-nothing cycles or a rotation has left a person without any partners to propose to.
The complete algorithm consists of an initialization phase (not shown), which generates a random preference list for each person, followed by calls to PHASE I and PHASE II. Figure 4 shows the average running times of the different phases on random instances of varying size n. The only phase that scales like Θ(n 2 ) is the initialization, i.e., the generation of the random permutation of the preference lists. The time for the actual solution (phase I and phase II) grows significantly slower than n 2 , which implies that the algorithm doesn't need to look at the complete preference table to solve the problem. Figure 5 shows the average number of entries in the preference lists that are actually read by Irving's algorithm in order to find a stable matching or to report that no stable matching exists. For large values of n, this number is 2n The number of elements read in phase I is even smaller. Phase I terminates if every person holds a proposal, but the sequence of proposals is random: phase I essentially solves the coupon collector's problem wih n coupons (proposals) [Moore and Mertens 2011] . It is well known that a collector should expect to buy
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coupons in order to own at least one coupon of every kind. H n is known as the nth harmonic number. Note that
where γ = 0.5772156 . . . is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. In our case, the expected number of proposals in phase I is nH n , and since each proposal implies two accesses to the preference lists, the number of elements read in phase I should be 2nH n . This is in fact the observed asymptotic scaling, as can be seen in Figure 5 .
We can exploit the fact that Irving's algorithm looks only at O(n 3/2 ) elements of preference table by generating and storing only the elements that are requested by the algorithm. This saves us the expensive initialization phase and reduces the memory consumption considerably. Figure 6 shows the corresponding version of the function GETDATA. It maintains two arrays (person and rank) of maps. A map (aka associative This time scales like n 2 , whereas the time for the actual solution (phases I and II) grows much slower. The time T is the average wallclock time in seconds on a single core of an Intel R Xeon R E5-1620 CPU running at 3.6 GHz. The "bump" in the data for phase I is probably due to cache misses for larger systems. array) is a data structure that holds pairs (k, v) where k is the key and v is the value of the data element. In the map person [x] , the key is the person and the value is the rank of that person in x's preference list. The map rank [x] holds the same data elements but with the role of key and value reversed. The rationale behind this redundancy is again efficiency: a map can be implemented such that the lookup of a value given the key can be done in (expected) constant time, independent of the number of elements. Hence GETDATA has average time complexity O(1) when the requested data element is already known. When the requested element is new, the generation of a new random element may take longer since we need to generate a random person y that is not contained in x's preference list so far and an unoccupied rank r for person x in y's list. Both are computed by a simple loop that generates random numbers until it hits a number not already contained in the list. In our case this is a reasonable approach since we know that the expected number of elements in person [x] and rank[y] is O( √ n), hence the expected number of iterations in our loop is 1+O(n −1/2 ). Since inserting new elements in a map can also be done in constant time, the average time complexity of GETDATA is O(1).
The function GETDATA is called unconditionally from within the innermost loop in phase I. In phase II it is called for each element in search for a cycle (including all cycle elements). Hence the number of calls of GETDATA is a good measure for the average time complexity of the algorithm. As can be seen in Figure 7 , the average time complexity is indeed Θ(n 3 2 ). The O(n 3 2 ) average space complexity of the algorithm follows from Figure 5 and the fact that only those elements are stored that are requested by the algorithm.
APPLICATION
A long standing open problem is the computation of the probability p n that a random instance of the stable roommates problem of size n has a stable matching [Gusfield and Irving 1989, problem 8] . In particular one is interested in the asymptotic behavior of p n as n grows large.
Pittel [Pittel 1993 ] derived an integral representation of p n that can be used to compute p n exactly. Unfortunately, the number of terms in the integral increases exponentially with n 2 , which restricts this approach to small values of n. Using a computer algebra system, we computed 
Evaluating the integral for p 10 seems to be infeasible even with a computer. Monte Carlo simulations indicate that p n is a monotonically decreasing function of n, but early simulations up to n = 2000 [Pittel and Irving 1994] did not settle the question as to whether p n converges to 0 or to some positive constant. The problem with simulations is that the decay of p n is rather slow. In fact Pittel [Pittel 1993 ] proved the asymptotic lower bound
by applying the second moment method to the number of stable matchings. Extended simulations [Mertens 2005 ] up to n = 20000 suggested an algebraic decay p n an −δ . The numerical data from [Mertens 2005 ] was used to boldly conjecture the values of a and δ as p n e 2 π n −1/4 .
Using our algorithm with reduced running time and memory consumption, we can check this conjecture against extended numerical data. We simulated systems of size n = n 0 2 k , k = 0, . . . , 12 and n 0 ∈ {8, 10, 12, 14}. To measure p n , we generate and solve M independent random instances of size n and record the fractionp n of samples that admit a stable matching. The 95% confidence interval for p n is thenp n ± 2σ n , where the variance is given by
We vary the number of samples M with the system size n. We used values from M = 10 10 for n ≤ 100 down to M = 2 · 10 6 for n > 40000. Table I shows the results. Figure 8 shows p n versus n in a log-log-plot. The data supports an asymptotic algebraic decay p n an −δ for some constants δ and a, in agreement with the conjecture (4), which is also displayed in Figure 8 .
The data seems to disagree slightly with the numerical constants in (4), but a closer look reveals that this is actually not true. To see this, we used least-square fitting of an −δ to windows of w consecutive data points p n . Figure 9 shows the result. Allthough the present data is best fitted by values of a and δ that are slightly smaller than the conjectured values, the fitted values seem to converge to δ = 1/4 and a = e 2/π as n goes to infinity. A:12
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
We have demonstrated that Irving's algorithm for the stable roommates problem can be organized such that the expected time and space complexity is O(n 3/2 ) on random instances. Our reasoning about the dynamics of the algorithm (approaching random walks of leftrank and rightrank, phase I as coupon collector's problem) is of course non-rigorous, but the results are well confirmed by the numerical simulations. Maybe this simplistic view on Irving's algorithm can help to derive the observed n −1/4 decay of the probability p n that a random instance of size n has a solution.
